We talked earlier about how increasing government debt crowds out the necessary savings for private investment, which is the real factor in increasing productivity. But there is another part of that equation, and that is the percentage of government spending in relationship to the overall economy. Let's look at some recent analysis by Charles Gave of GaveKal Research.
It seems that bigger government leads to slower growth. The chart below is for France, but the general principle holds across countries. It shows the ratio of the private sector to the public sector and relates it to growth. The correlation is high. (In the book we will show the same graph for other countries.)
That is not to say that the best environment for growth is a 0% government. There is clearly a role for government, but government does cost and that takes money from the productive private sector.
Charles next shows us the ratio of the public sector to the private sector when compared to unemployment (again in France). While there are clearly some periods where there are clear divergences (and those would be even more clear in a US chart), there is a clear correlation over time.
And that makes sense, given our argument that it is the private sector that increases productivity. Government transfer payments do not. You need a vibrant private sector and dynamic small businesses to really see growth in jobs.
And at some point, government spending becomes an anchor on the economy. In an environment where assets (stocks and housing) have shrunk over the last decade and consumers in the US and elsewhere are increasing their savings and reducing debt as retirement looms for an aging Boomer generation, the current policies of stimulus make less and less sense. As Charles argues:
"This is the law of unintended consequences at work: if an individual receives US$100 from the government, and at the same time the value of his portfolio/house falls by US$500, what is the individual likely to do? Spend the US$100 or save it to compensate for the capital loss he has just had to endure and perhaps reduce his consumption even further?
"The only way that one can expect Keynesian policies to break the 'paradox of thrift' is to make the bet that people are foolish, and that they will disregard the deterioration in their balance sheets and simply look at the improvements in their income statements.
"This seems unlikely. Worse yet, even if individuals are foolish enough to disregard their balance sheets, banks surely won't; policies that push asset prices lower are bound to lead to further contractions in bank lending. This is why 'stimulating consumption' in the middle of a balance sheet recession (as Japan has tried to do for two decades) is worse than useless, it is detrimental to a recovery.
"With fragile balance sheets the main issue in most markets today, the last thing OECD governments should want to do is to boost income statements at the expense of balance sheets. This probably explains why, the more the US administration talks about a second stimulus bill, the weaker US retail sales, US housing and the US$ are likely to be. It probably also helps explain why US retail investor confidence today stands at a record low."
This is the fundamental mistake that so many analysts and economists make about today's economic landscape. They assume that the recent recession and aftermath are like all past recessions since WWII. A little Keynesian stimulus and the consumer and business sectors will get back on track. But this is a very different environment. It is the end of the Debt Supercycle. It is Mohammed El-Erian's New Normal.
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