January 8, 2010

CRE Update

This is a very educational article by Atlantic writer Megan McArdle:

Commercial mortgage lenders basically have to worry about two kinds of default risk: cash-flow risk, and asset-price risk. Cash-flow risk is what happens to homeowners when the primary breadwinner becomes unemployed, and to landlords or hotel owners when rental prices plummet. Since commercial tenants typically sign relatively long leases, this problem tends to grow slowly except in hotels—and, apparently, in rent-controlled properties with litigious tenants.

.....In some ways, price declines are a bigger problem for landlords than for homeowners. Unless forced to move, homeowners with long-term mortgages who make enough to cover their payments can sit tight and hope the market recovers. Landlords, however, typically take out commercial loans for shorter terms of three to 10 years. In normal times, landlords coming to the end of a mortgage simply roll the debt over into a new loan. But collapsing asset values have wreaked havoc on this process.

Now, as loans come up for renewal, lenders have to reassess how much credit they’re willing to extend. Take a property that was worth $100million in 2007, when it was financed with a four-year, $70million mortgage. That’s a reasonably conservative 70percent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. But if the building is worth only $70million when it’s time to roll the loan over, keeping the LTV at 70percent means that the owners can now borrow only $49million, and have to come up with tens of millions to pay off the original loan. Worse, as the markets tighten, lenders tend to want to see a lower LTV in the deals they finance.

............the repercussions from the commercial collapse will not be as great as those from the housing sector. The commercial market is considerably smaller than the residential market. The existing FDIC system can handle the decline, which will likely hit smaller banks harder than those in the “too big to fail” bracket. Moreover, fraud was probably much more prevalent in the residential than the commercial market, where even the newbie investors tend to be financial professionals or established businesspeople, not hustlers looking for a quick flip.

But given how experienced those investors were, why are our problems now as bad as they are? Fraud aside, Gyourko notes that at the height of its bubble, the commercial real-estate market displayed most of the pathologies that characterized the residential side. Only 50percent of the increase in prices between 2003 and 2008 resulted from rising rents, he says; the rest was just inflated optimism about the rents landlords would be able to charge sometime in the future. And just as in housing, banks joined the folly, increasing the LTVs and requiring less amortization over the life of the loan.

........The best explanation for the calamity that has overtaken us may simply be that cheap money makes us all stupid. The massive inflows of international capital, which Ben Bernanke has called the “global savings glut,” poured into our loan markets, driving interest rates lower—and, since most real estate is purchased with borrowed funds, pushing up the price of property in both the commercial and residential sectors. Rising prices, in turn, disguised any potential problems with the borrowers, because if they ran into cash-flow problems, they could always refinance, or sell. Everyone was getting bad signals from the market, and outlandish purchases looked almost rational.

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